Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in tool calling and tool usage, but suffer from hallucinations where they choose incorrect tools, provide malformed parameters and exhibit 'tool bypass' behavior by performing simulations and generating outputs instead of invoking specialized tools or external systems. This undermines the reliability of LLM based agents in production systems as it leads to inconsistent results, and bypasses security and audit controls. Such hallucinations in agent tool selection require early detection and error handling. Unlike existing hallucination detection methods that require multiple forward passes or external validation, we present a computationally efficient framework that detects tool-calling hallucinations in real-time by leveraging LLMs' internal representations during the same forward pass used for generation. We evaluate this approach on reasoning tasks across multiple domains, demonstrating strong detection performance (up to 86.4\% accuracy) while maintaining real-time inference capabilities with minimal computational overhead, particularly excelling at detecting parameter-level hallucinations and inappropriate tool selections, critical for reliable agent deployment.

We propose the Data Contamination Quiz (DCQ), a simple and effective approach to detect data contamination in large language models (LLMs) and estimate the amount of it. Specifically, we frame data contamination detection as a series of multiple-choice questions, devising a quiz format wherein three perturbed versions of each instance, subsampled from a specific dataset partition, are created. These changes only include word-level perturbations. The generated perturbations, along with the original dataset instance, form the options in the DCQ, with an extra option accommodating the selection of none of the provided options. Given that the only distinguishing signal among the options is the exact wording with respect to the original dataset instance, an LLM, when tasked with identifying the original dataset instance, gravitates towards selecting the original one if it has been exposed to it. While accounting for positional biases in LLMs, the quiz performance reveals the contamination level for the tested model with the dataset partition to which the quiz pertains. Applied to various datasets and LLMs, under controlled and uncontrolled contamination, our findings, while fully lacking access to training data and model parameters, suggest that DCQ achieves state-of-the-art results and uncovers greater contamination levels through memorization compared to existing methods. Also, it proficiently bypasses more safety filters, especially those set to avoid generating copyrighted content.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have emerged as powerful tools for automating complex tasks by leveraging the reasoning and decision-making abilities of LLMs. However, a major bottleneck in current agent frameworks lies in the high inference cost of tool selection, especially in approaches like ReAct that repeatedly invoke the LLM to determine which tool to use at each step. In this work, we propose AutoTool, a novel graph-based framework that bypasses repeated LLM inference by exploiting a key empirical observation: tool usage inertia - the tendency of tool invocations to follow predictable sequential patterns. AutoTool constructs a directed graph from historical agent trajectories, where nodes represent tools and edges capture transition probabilities, effectively modeling the inertia in tool selection. It further integrates parameter-level information to refine tool input generation. By traversing this structured representation, AutoTool efficiently selects tools and their parameters with minimal reliance on LLM inference. Extensive experiments across diverse agent tasks demonstrate that AutoTool reduces inference costs by up to 30% while maintaining competitive task completion rates, offering a practical and scalable enhancement for inference-heavy frameworks. Our work highlights the promise of integrating statistical structure into LLM agent design for greater efficiency without sacrificing performance.

Text-to-image diffusion models, e.g. Stable Diffusion (SD), lately have shown remarkable ability in high-quality content generation, and become one of the representatives for the recent wave of transformative AI. Nevertheless, such advance comes with an intensifying concern about the misuse of this generative technology, especially for producing copyrighted or NSFW (i.e. not safe for work) images. Although efforts have been made to filter inappropriate images/prompts or remove undesirable concepts/styles via model fine-tuning, the reliability of these safety mechanisms against diversified problematic prompts remains largely unexplored. In this work, we propose Prompting4Debugging (P4D) as a debugging and red-teaming tool that automatically finds problematic prompts for diffusion models to test the reliability of a deployed safety mechanism. We demonstrate the efficacy of our P4D tool in uncovering new vulnerabilities of SD models with safety mechanisms. Particularly, our result shows that around half of prompts in existing safe prompting benchmarks which were originally considered "safe" can actually be manipulated to bypass many deployed safety mechanisms, including concept removal, negative prompt, and safety guidance. Our findings suggest that, without comprehensive testing, the evaluations on limited safe prompting benchmarks can lead to a false sense of safety for text-to-image models.

While prior red-teaming efforts have focused on eliciting harmful text outputs from large language models (LLMs), such approaches fail to capture agent-specific vulnerabilities that emerge through multi-step tool execution, particularly in rapidly growing ecosystems such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP). To address this gap, we propose a trajectory-aware evolutionary search method, T-MAP, which leverages execution trajectories to guide the discovery of adversarial prompts. Our approach enables the automatic generation of attacks that not only bypass safety guardrails but also reliably realize harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Empirical evaluations across diverse MCP environments demonstrate that T-MAP substantially outperforms baselines in attack realization rate (ARR) and remains effective against frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM-5, thereby revealing previously underexplored vulnerabilities in autonomous LLM agents.

Sound designers and Foley artists usually sonorize a scene, such as from a movie or video game, by manually annotating and sonorizing each action of interest in the video. In our case, the intent is to leave full creative control to sound designers with a tool that allows them to bypass the more repetitive parts of their work, thus being able to focus on the creative aspects of sound production. We achieve this presenting Stable-V2A, a two-stage model consisting of: an RMS-Mapper that estimates an envelope representative of the audio characteristics associated with the input video; and Stable-Foley, a diffusion model based on Stable Audio Open that generates audio semantically and temporally aligned with the target video. Temporal alignment is guaranteed by the use of the envelope as a ControlNet input, while semantic alignment is achieved through the use of sound representations chosen by the designer as cross-attention conditioning of the diffusion process. We train and test our model on Greatest Hits, a dataset commonly used to evaluate V2A models. In addition, to test our model on a case study of interest, we introduce Walking The Maps, a dataset of videos extracted from video games depicting animated characters walking in different locations. Samples and code available on our demo page at https://ispamm.github.io/Stable-V2A.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Tool-augmented large language models (LLMs) are often trained on datasets of query-response pairs, which embed the ability to use tools or APIs directly into the parametric knowledge of LLMs. Tool-augmented LLMs need the ability to forget learned tools due to security vulnerabilities, privacy regulations, or tool deprecations. However, ``tool unlearning'' has not been investigated in unlearning literature. We introduce this novel task, which requires addressing distinct challenges compared to traditional unlearning: knowledge removal rather than forgetting individual samples, the high cost of optimizing LLMs, and the need for principled evaluation metrics. To bridge these gaps, we propose ToolDelete, the first approach for unlearning tools from tool-augmented LLMs. It implements three key properties to address the above challenges for effective tool unlearning and introduces a new membership inference attack (MIA) model for effective evaluation. Extensive experiments on multiple tool learning datasets and tool-augmented LLMs show that ToolDelete effectively unlearns randomly selected tools, while preserving the LLM's knowledge on non-deleted tools and maintaining performance on general tasks.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

Large language models increasingly operate as autonomous agents that select and invoke tools from large registries. We identify a critical gap: when unauthorized tools are visible in an agent's context, models select them in adversarial scenarios -- even when explicitly instructed otherwise. We propose a governed MCP proxy that enforces attribute-based access control (ABAC) at two points: tool discovery, where unauthorized tools are removed from the model's context window, and tool invocation, where a second check blocks any unauthorized call. Across three models (Qwen 2.5 7B, Llama 3.1 8B, Claude Haiku 3.5) and 150 adversarial tasks spanning four attack categories, our proxy reduces unauthorized invocation rate (UIR) to 0% while adding under 50ms median latency. Prompt-based restrictions reduce UIR by only 11--18 percentage points, leaving substantial residual risk. Our results show that architectural enforcement -- not prompting -- is necessary for reliable tool access control in deployed agentic systems.

Tool selection is a key component of LLM agents. A popular approach follows a two-step process - retrieval and selection - to pick the most appropriate tool from a tool library for a given task. In this work, we introduce ToolHijacker, a novel prompt injection attack targeting tool selection in no-box scenarios. ToolHijacker injects a malicious tool document into the tool library to manipulate the LLM agent's tool selection process, compelling it to consistently choose the attacker's malicious tool for an attacker-chosen target task. Specifically, we formulate the crafting of such tool documents as an optimization problem and propose a two-phase optimization strategy to solve it. Our extensive experimental evaluation shows that ToolHijacker is highly effective, significantly outperforming existing manual-based and automated prompt injection attacks when applied to tool selection. Moreover, we explore various defenses, including prevention-based defenses (StruQ and SecAlign) and detection-based defenses (known-answer detection, DataSentinel, perplexity detection, and perplexity windowed detection). Our experimental results indicate that these defenses are insufficient, highlighting the urgent need for developing new defense strategies.

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

Tool-augmented LLM agents tend to call tools indiscriminately, even when the model can answer directly. Each unnecessary call wastes API fees and latency, yet no existing benchmark systematically studies when a tool call is actually needed. We propose When2Tool, a benchmark of 18 environments (15 single-hop, 3 multi-hop) spanning three categories of tool necessity -- computational scale, knowledge boundaries, and execution reliability -- each with controlled difficulty levels that create a clear decision boundary between tool-necessary and tool-unnecessary tasks. We evaluate two families of training-free baselines: Prompt-only (varying the prompt to discourage unnecessary calls) and Reason-then-Act (requiring the model to reason about tool necessity before acting). Both provide limited control: Prompt-only suppresses necessary calls alongside unnecessary ones, and Reason-then-Act still incurs a disproportionate accuracy cost on hard tasks. To understand why these baselines fail, we probe the models' hidden states and find that tool necessity is linearly decodable from the pre-generation representation with AUROC 0.89--0.96 across six models, substantially exceeding the model's own verbalized reasoning. This reveals that models already know when tools are needed, but fail to act on this knowledge during generation. Building on this finding, we propose Probe&Prefill, which uses a lightweight linear probe to read the hidden-state signal and prefills the model's response with a steering sentence. Across all models tested, Probe&Prefill reduces tool calls by 48% with only 1.7% accuracy loss, while the best baseline at comparable accuracy only reduces 6% of tool calls, or achieves a similar tool call reduction but incurs a 5times higher accuracy loss. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/when2tool

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

Tool-integrated reasoning (TIR) enables large language models (LLMs) to enhance their capabilities by interacting with external tools, such as code interpreters (CI). Most recent studies focus on exploring various methods to equip LLMs with the ability to use tools. However, how to further boost the reasoning ability of already tool-capable LLMs at inference time remains underexplored. Improving reasoning at inference time requires no additional training and can help LLMs better leverage tools to solve problems. We observe that, during tool-capable LLM inference, both the number and the proportion of erroneous tool calls are negatively correlated with answer correctness. Moreover, erroneous tool calls are typically resolved successfully within a few subsequent turns. If not, LLMs often struggle to resolve such errors even with many additional turns. Building on the above observations, we propose PruneTIR, a rather effective yet efficient framework that enhances the tool-integrated reasoning at inference time. During LLM inference, PruneTIR prunes trajectories, resamples tool calls, and suspends tool usage through three components: Success-Triggered Pruning, Stuck-Triggered Pruning and Resampling, and Retry-Triggered Tool Suspension. These three components enable PruneTIR to mitigate the negative impact of erroneous tool calls and prevent LLMs from getting stuck in repeated failed resolution attempts, thereby improving overall LLM performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of PruneTIR, which significantly improves Pass@1 and efficiency while reducing the working context length for tool-capable LLMs.