Daily Papers

Communication is defined as "Who says what to whom with what effect." A message from a communicator generates downstream receiver effects, also known as behavior. Receiver behavior, being a downstream effect of the message, carries rich signals about it. Even after carrying signals about the message, the behavior data is often ignored while training large language models. We show that training LLMs on receiver behavior can actually help improve their content-understanding abilities. Specifically, we show that training LLMs to predict the receiver behavior of likes and comments improves the LLM's performance on a wide variety of downstream content understanding tasks. We show this performance increase over 40 video and image understanding tasks over 23 benchmark datasets across both 0-shot and fine-tuning settings, outperforming many supervised baselines. Moreover, since receiver behavior, such as likes and comments, is collected by default on the internet and does not need any human annotations to be useful, the performance improvement we get after training on this data is essentially free-lunch. We release the receiver behavior cleaned comments and likes of 750k images and videos collected from multiple platforms along with our instruction-tuning data.

Shannon, in his seminal paper introducing information theory, divided the communication into three levels: technical, semantic, and effectivenss. While the technical level is concerned with accurate reconstruction of transmitted symbols, the semantic and effectiveness levels deal with the inferred meaning and its effect on the receiver. Thanks to telecommunications, the first level problem has produced great advances like the internet. Large Language Models (LLMs) make some progress towards the second goal, but the third level still remains largely untouched. The third problem deals with predicting and optimizing communication for desired receiver behavior. LLMs, while showing wide generalization capabilities across a wide range of tasks, are unable to solve for this. One reason for the underperformance could be a lack of "behavior tokens" in LLMs' training corpora. Behavior tokens define receiver behavior over a communication, such as shares, likes, clicks, purchases, retweets, etc. While preprocessing data for LLM training, behavior tokens are often removed from the corpora as noise. Therefore, in this paper, we make some initial progress towards reintroducing behavior tokens in LLM training. The trained models, other than showing similar performance to LLMs on content understanding tasks, show generalization capabilities on behavior simulation, content simulation, behavior understanding, and behavior domain adaptation. Using a wide range of tasks on two corpora, we show results on all these capabilities. We call these models Large Content and Behavior Models (LCBMs). Further, to spur more research on LCBMs, we release our new Content Behavior Corpus (CBC), a repository containing communicator, message, and corresponding receiver behavior.

While the temporal variations of the spectro-polarimetric nature of pulsars remains unexplored, this investigation offers significant potential for uncovering key insights into pulsar emission mechanisms, magnetic field geometry, and propagation effects within the magnetosphere. We developed a package for investigating time-varying spectral behavior for full Stokes parameters and demonstrate it on a millisecond pulsar (MSP) J2144-5237 in a binary system (orbital period ~10 days) using the Parkes UWL receiver. In this study we report rotation measure (RM) variation with orbital phase. We find that the temporal variations in the spectra of Stokes I, Q, and V are generally correlated throughout the orbit, while Stokes U exhibits intervals of both correlation and anticorrelation with Stokes I, depending on the orbital phase. We also provide a Poincare sphere representation of the polarization properties of J2144-5237, demonstrating a systematic temporal change of Poincare sphere location for the main component with orbital phase. To our knowledge, this is the first investigation of time-varying properties of the spectro-polarimetric nature of any pulsars or MSPs. Extending this study to probe the spectro-temporal nature of full Stokes data on a larger sample of MSPs or pulsars has the potential to provide vital information on emission mechanisms inside the magnetosphere, interstellar propagation effects, and binary interactions.

Channel state information (CSI) is essential for adaptive beamforming and maintaining robust links in wireless communication systems. However, acquiring CSI incurs significant overhead, consuming up to 25% of spectrum resources in 5G networks due to frequent pilot transmissions at millisecond-scale intervals. Recent approaches aim to reduce this burden by reconstructing CSI from spatiotemporal RF measurements, such as signal strength and direction-of-arrival. While effective in offline settings, these methods often suffer from inference latencies in the 5-100 ms range, making them impractical for real-time systems. We present GSpaRC: Gaussian Splatting for Real-time Reconstruction of RF Channels, a method that achieves accurate channel reconstruction with latency in the low-millisecond regime or below. GSpaRC represents the RF environment using a compact set of 3D Gaussian primitives, each parameterized by a lightweight neural model augmented with physics-informed features such as distance-based attenuation. Unlike traditional vision-based splatting pipelines, GSpaRC is tailored for RF reception: it employs an equirectangular projection onto a hemispherical surface centered at the receiver to reflect omnidirectional antenna behavior. A custom CUDA pipeline enables fully parallelized directional sorting, splatting, and rendering across frequency and spatial dimensions. Evaluated on multiple RF datasets, GSpaRC achieves similar CSI reconstruction fidelity to recent state-of-the-art methods while reducing training and inference time by over an order of magnitude. These results illustrate that modest GPU computation can substantially reduce pilot overhead, making GSpaRC a scalable low-latency approach for channel estimation in 5G and future wireless systems.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

When artificial agents are jointly trained to perform collaborative tasks using a communication channel, they develop opaque goal-oriented communication protocols. Good task performance is often considered sufficient evidence that meaningful communication is taking place, but existing empirical results show that communication strategies induced by common objectives can be counterintuitive whilst solving the task nearly perfectly. In this work, we identify a goal-agnostic prerequisite to meaningful communication, which we term semantic consistency, based on the idea that messages should have similar meanings across instances. We provide a formal definition for this idea, and use it to compare the two most common objectives in the field of emergent communication: discrimination and reconstruction. We prove, under mild assumptions, that semantically inconsistent communication protocols can be optimal solutions to the discrimination task, but not to reconstruction. We further show that the reconstruction objective encourages a stricter property, spatial meaningfulness, which also accounts for the distance between messages. Experiments with emergent communication games validate our theoretical results. These findings demonstrate an inherent advantage of distance-based communication goals, and contextualize previous empirical discoveries.

In recent years, foundational models have revolutionized the fields of language and vision, demonstrating remarkable abilities in understanding and generating complex data; however, similar advances in user behavior modeling have been limited, largely due to the complexity of behavioral data and the challenges involved in capturing intricate temporal and contextual relationships in user activities. To address this, we propose BehaveGPT, a foundational model designed specifically for large-scale user behavior prediction. Leveraging transformer-based architecture and a novel pretraining paradigm, BehaveGPT is trained on vast user behavior datasets, allowing it to learn complex behavior patterns and support a range of downstream tasks, including next behavior prediction, long-term generation, and cross-domain adaptation. Our approach introduces the DRO-based pretraining paradigm tailored for user behavior data, which improves model generalization and transferability by equitably modeling both head and tail behaviors. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate that BehaveGPT outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving more than a 10% improvement in macro and weighted recall, showcasing its ability to effectively capture and predict user behavior. Furthermore, we measure the scaling law in the user behavior domain for the first time on the Honor dataset, providing insights into how model performance scales with increased data and parameter sizes.

We propose a targeted communication architecture for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents learn both what messages to send and whom to address them to while performing cooperative tasks in partially-observable environments. This targeting behavior is learnt solely from downstream task-specific reward without any communication supervision. We additionally augment this with a multi-round communication approach where agents coordinate via multiple rounds of communication before taking actions in the environment. We evaluate our approach on a diverse set of cooperative multi-agent tasks, of varying difficulties, with varying number of agents, in a variety of environments ranging from 2D grid layouts of shapes and simulated traffic junctions to 3D indoor environments, and demonstrate the benefits of targeted and multi-round communication. Moreover, we show that the targeted communication strategies learned by agents are interpretable and intuitive. Finally, we show that our architecture can be easily extended to mixed and competitive environments, leading to improved performance and sample complexity over recent state-of-the-art approaches.

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

LLM agents exhibit a consistent tendency to over-call, invoking tools even in situations where none is needed. On the When2Call benchmark, six models from three families show high call accuracy but much lower no-call accuracy, leaving overall accuracy in the 55%-70% range. We trace this to an Intrinsic Bias Hypothesis (IBH): the call/no-call decision mapping carries an activation-independent call offset, so the model favors call even at activation parity. Using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), we recover behavior-aligned feature bases for the call/no_call decision, reduce them to a signed activation margin, and estimate the offset directly. Across all six models, the model is decision-neutral only when no_call activation outweighs call activation, consistent with IBH. We then causally test IBH with Adaptive Margin-Calibrated Steering (AMCS), a closed-form counter-bias shift along SAE decoder directions. Cancelling the diagnosed offset mitigates over-calling and improves overall accuracy with a negligible drop in call accuracy. Our work recasts over-calling from an empirical phenomenon into a mechanistic object amenable to causal correction. Code is available at https://github.com/SKURA502/agent-sae/.

The realization that complex systems such as ecological communities can collapse or shift regimes suddenly and without rapid external forcing poses a serious challenge to our understanding and management of the natural world. The potential to identify early warning signals that would allow researchers and managers to predict such events before they happen has therefore been an invaluable discovery that offers a way forward in spite of such seemingly unpredictable behavior. Research into early warning signals has demonstrated that it is possible to define and detect such early warning signals in advance of a transition in certain contexts. Here we describe the pattern emerging as research continues to explore just how far we can generalize these results. A core of examples emerges that shares three properties: the phenomenon of rapid regime shifts, a pattern of 'critical slowing down' that can be used to detect the approaching shift, and a mechanism of bifurcation driving the sudden change. As research has expanded beyond these core examples, it is becoming clear that not all systems that show regime shifts exhibit critical slowing down, or vice versa. Even when systems exhibit critical slowing down, statistical detection is a challenge. We review the literature that explores these edge cases and highlight the need for (a) new early warning behaviors that can be used in cases where rapid shifts do not exhibit critical slowing down, (b) the development of methods to identify which behavior might be an appropriate signal when encountering a novel system; bearing in mind that a positive indication for some systems is a negative indication in others, and (c) statistical methods that can distinguish between signatures of early warning behaviors and noise.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

When multiple large language models interact in a shared conversation, do they develop differentiated social roles or converge toward uniform behavior? We present a controlled experimental platform that orchestrates simultaneous multi-agent discussions among 7 heterogeneous LLMs on a unified inference backend, systematically varying group composition, naming conventions, and prompt structure across 12 experimental series (208 runs, 13,786 coded messages). Each message is independently coded on six behavioral flags by two LLM judges from distinct model families (Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Sonnet 4.6), achieving mean Cohen's kappa = 0.78 with conservative intersection-based adjudication. Human validation on 609 randomly stratified messages confirmed coding reliability (mean kappa = 0.73 vs. Gemini). We find that (1) heterogeneous groups exhibit significantly richer behavioral differentiation than homogeneous groups (cosine similarity 0.56 vs. 0.85; p < 10^-5, r = 0.70); (2) groups spontaneously exhibit compensatory response patterns when an agent crashes; (3) revealing real model names significantly increases behavioral convergence (cosine 0.56 to 0.77, p = 0.001); and (4) removing all prompt scaffolding converges profiles to homogeneous-level similarity (p < 0.001). Critically, these behaviors are absent when agents operate in isolation, confirming that behavioral diversity is a structured, reproducible phenomenon driven by the interaction of architectural heterogeneity, group context, and prompt-level scaffolding.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

In mobile telecommunications, alarms act as early warning signals. They are triggered when a cell, the basic unit of radio coverage, shuts down or behaves abnormally. This signals a degradation in service quality, which directly affects the customer experience. To fix the issue, operators rely on preset thresholds to decide when an engineer should be sent out. In practice, these thresholds are set manually and remain fixed regardless of the time of day, traffic levels, or overall network conditions. This often leads to serious faults slipping through during busy hours, while minor issues can cause unnecessary callouts when the network is quiet. This paper presents a machine learning framework that automatically predicts four alarm thresholds, audit window duration, inactive time limit, total fluctuation count, and per hour fluctuation limit, from live network behavior. Since no ground truth labels exist for thresholds, we introduce a percentile guided label derivation strategy and evaluate four models on an anonymized dataset of 10,648 cells across three vendors and nine regions from a real 4G network, comprising a Gradient Boosted Trees baseline, a CNN-BiLSTM with attention, the proposed PCTN, and an iTransformer. PCTN performs the best overall with respect to three of the four targets, outperforming a state-of-the-art iTransformer while using 83 percent fewer parameters. Its mixed output heads and dynamic alpha mechanism produce thresholds that are both accurate and interpretable, allowing operators to inspect and adjust the learned policy without retraining. All comparisons are statistically significant at p < 0.001. The framework undergoes daily retraining using new data, which enables the thresholds to constantly adjust to changes in the network.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Agentic AI systems increasingly operate in shared social environments where they exchange information, instructions, and behavioral cues. However, little empirical evidence exists on how such agents regulate one another in the absence of human participants or centralized moderation. In this work, we present an empirical analysis of OpenClaw agents interacting on Moltbook, an agent-only social network. Analyzing 39,026 posts and 5,712 comments produced by 14,490 agents, we quantify the prevalence of action-inducing instruction sharing using a lexicon-based Action-Inducing Risk Score (AIRS), and examine how other agents respond to such content. We find that 18.4% of posts contain action-inducing language, indicating that instruction sharing is a routine behavior in this environment. While most social responses are neutral, posts containing actionable instructions are significantly more likely to elicit norm-enforcing replies that caution against unsafe or risky behavior, compared to non-instructional posts. Importantly, toxic responses remain rare across both conditions. These results suggest that OpenClaw agents exhibit selective social regulation, whereby potentially risky instructions are more likely to be challenged than neutral content, despite the absence of human oversight. Our findings provide early empirical evidence of emergent normative behavior in agent-only social systems and highlight the importance of studying social dynamics alongside technical safeguards in agentic AI ecosystems.

We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.

This paper investigates the problem of interactively learning behaviors communicated by a human teacher using positive and negative feedback. Much previous work on this problem has made the assumption that people provide feedback for decisions that is dependent on the behavior they are teaching and is independent from the learner's current policy. We present empirical results that show this assumption to be false -- whether human trainers give a positive or negative feedback for a decision is influenced by the learner's current policy. Based on this insight, we introduce {\em Convergent Actor-Critic by Humans} (COACH), an algorithm for learning from policy-dependent feedback that converges to a local optimum. Finally, we demonstrate that COACH can successfully learn multiple behaviors on a physical robot.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has achieved significant results, most notably by leveraging the representation-learning abilities of deep neural networks. However, large centralized approaches quickly become infeasible as the number of agents scale, and fully decentralized approaches can miss important opportunities for information sharing and coordination. Furthermore, not all agents are equal -- in some cases, individual agents may not even have the ability to send communication to other agents or explicitly model other agents. This paper considers the case where there is a single, powerful, central agent that can observe the entire observation space, and there are multiple, low-powered local agents that can only receive local observations and are not able to communicate with each other. The central agent's job is to learn what message needs to be sent to different local agents based on the global observations, not by centrally solving the entire problem and sending action commands, but by determining what additional information an individual agent should receive so that it can make a better decision. In this work we present our MARL algorithm \algo, describe where it would be most applicable, and implement it in the cooperative navigation and multi-agent walker domains. Empirical results show that 1) learned communication does indeed improve system performance, 2) results generalize to heterogeneous local agents, and 3) results generalize to different reward structures.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an information-theoretic approach to intrinsic motivation, based on maximizing an agent's empowerment (the mutual information between its past actions and future states). We show that this approach generalizes previous attempts to formalize intrinsic motivation, and we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the necessary quantities. We test our approach on several benchmark control problems, and we explain its success in guiding intrinsically motivated behaviors by relating our information-theoretic control function to fundamental properties of the dynamical system representing the combined agent-environment system. This opens the door for designing practical artificial, intrinsically motivated controllers and for linking animal behaviors to their dynamical properties.